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  As a result of economies of size, food processors are generally large and few in number. These 
characteristics put processors at a bargaining advantage over independent farmers. Marketing 
cooperatives were established to counter the uneven bargaining position of individual farmers. 
This article investigates the relative bargaining strength of one milk marketing cooperative and 
several fluid milk processors. The Nash bargaining model can be used to analyze the negoti-
ated price in the Florida fluid milk market which acts like a bilateral monopoly. The milk 
marketing cooperatives have bargained well with the milk marketing processors. The monthly 
bargaining strength of the Southeast Dairy Cooperative, Inc. (SDC), exceeds the monthly bar-
gaining strength of the processors in all twelve months, ranging from a low of 0.6664 in Janu-
ary to a high of 0.7831 in September. The monthly average bargaining strength across all 
months for SDC is 0.7326. 
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As a result of economies of size, food processors 
are generally large and few in number (Durham 
and Sexton 1992). These characteristics put proc-
essors at a bargaining advantage over independ-
ent farmers. Marketing cooperatives were estab-
lished to counter the uneven bargaining position 
of individual farmers (Jesse et al. 1992). This arti-
cle investigates the relative bargaining strength of 
one milk marketing cooperative and several fluid 
milk processors. 
  The Southeast Dairy Cooperative, Inc. (SDC), 
supplies farm milk to several dairy fluid milk 
processors in Florida. From January 1999 through 
May 2002, SDC was composed of two coopera-
tives: Southeast Milk, Inc. (SMI), and the South-
east Council of Dairy Farmers of America, Inc. 
(DFA). SDC provided all of the milk to the Flor-
ida processors in 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002, ex-
cept for August 2000 and 2001 when Maryland/ 
Virginia producers provided some milk (USDA 
various issues). In 2002, there were eight proces-
sors who owned twelve fluid milk processing 
plants in Florida (USDA various issues). The av-
erage annual amount at each plant was 199,552,230 
pounds of fluid milk for Class 1 use (USDA vari-
ous issues). 
  The market structure is a monopoly on the sup-
ply side (SDC) and oligopsony on the processors’ 
side. When bargaining takes place, the market 
environment changes to one approximating a bi-
lateral monopoly. The bargaining environment is 
structured so that the price is negotiated monthly 
between SDC and one or two processors, with the 
remaining processors accepting the prices negoti-
ated by the lead processor(s). This market struc-
ture was first identified by Iskow and Sexton 
(1991) in the fruit and vegetable markets and was 
labeled as an approximate bilateral monopoly by 
Sexton (1993, page 49). 
  Equilibrium in a bilateral monopoly cannot be 
determined by traditional economic tools (supply 
and demand) (Koutsoyiannis 1979). The supply-
and-demand framework can define only the bar-
gaining price range that contains the solution out-
come (Helmberger and Chavas 1996). The pre-
cise price is determined through bargaining and 
will be investigated in this article. 
  The first section of this article describes the 
Florida farm milk market. The next section de-
scribes an axiomatic bargaining model found in 
the literature and adapts it to the Florida farm 
milk market. An econometric bargaining price 
model which contains the bargaining strength co-
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efficients is presented. Data for the variables and 
the econometric estimates of bargaining strength 
are analyzed. Finally, a summary and conclusions 
for the article are provided. 
 
 
Florida Farm Milk Market 
 
Supply contracts between SDC and Florida proc-
essors are for a one-year period and are renewed 
annually; however, the contract can be canceled 
by either party if a 60-days’ notice of cancellation 
is given. Each Thursday, processors order daily 
truckloads of milk for each week, starting on Sun-
day and ending on Saturday. Processors can 
amend their orders once they are placed. 
  The Federal Milk Marketing Order system has 
four classes of milk. Class 1 milk is farm milk 
used for drinking purposes. Class 2 milk is farm 
milk used for soft dairy products, such as ice 
cream and cottage cheese. Class 3 milk is farm 
milk used for hard cheeses. Class 4 milk is farm 
milk used for dry milk and butter. On a monthly 
basis, the Federal Marketing Order system sets 
the minimum price paid by processors and manu-
facturers for farm milk used in each class. Milk 
revenues are pooled in each marketing order and 
farmers are paid the sum of the revenue from 
each class. The total revenue from all milk classes 
is divided by total farm milk pounds pooled in the 
Federal Order, and this figure is then multiplied 
by the pounds of milk from each farmer in order 
to arrive at the farmer’s gross milk receipts before 
expenses are taken out (e.g., transportation costs). 
Also, each farmer receives a Class 1 differential 
which is added to the Class 1 price computed for 
each Federal Milk Marketing Order. The Class 1 
differential is different in each order and is in-
tended to move milk from surplus to deficit re-
gions if needed. 
 
 
A Generalized Nash Bargaining Model for the 
Florida Farm Milk Market 
 
Theoretic analyses of bilateral bargaining are 
categorized into static axiomatic and strategic 
approaches (Krishna and Serrano 1996). The static 
axiomatic approach was first proposed by Nash 
(1950). The Nash axiomatic approach has been 
popular in empirical work as it is simple to imple-
ment and can be interpreted as a stable bargaining 
convention which is immune to a particular 
argument presented by an arbitrary player (Coles 
and Hildreth 2000, Muthoo 1999). The strategic 
approach was initially introduced by Rubinstein 
(1982), who suggested the alternative-offer pro-
cedure and the idea of friction (i.e., the value of 
time) to the bargaining process. Later, Binmore, 
Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986) introduced the 
risk of breakdown into the Rubinstein alternative-
offer bargaining model. 
  The static axiomatic and strategic approaches 
are closely related. The results from the Rubin-
stein strategic model and the strategic model with 
the risk of breakdown approximate the solution 
suggested by Nash’s model when the response 
time between the parties during the game is small 
(Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky 1986). In-
deed, the Nash bargaining model is a special case 
of more elaborate strategic models that converge 
to the Nash model under certain assumptions 
(Burtraw 1993) (for more examples, see Binmore 
1987a, 1987b, 1987c). Furthermore, van Damme 
(1986) found that all solution bargaining concepts 
within a large class (meta-game) lead to the axio-
matic Nash bargaining solution. 
  The SDC and fluid milk processors reach con-
tract agreement through a monthly bargaining 
process that approximates a bilateral monopoly. 
This bargaining process is characterized by using 
the generalized axiomatic Nash approach. In or-
der to account for an asymmetric environment, 
the generalized Nash bargaining model is the 
original Nash bargaining model without the sym-
metry axiom (Roth 1979). This asymmetry can be 
used to determine the parties’ relative bargaining 
strengths in the negotiation. 
 The generalized Nash bargaining model 
(Muthoo 1999) for the price negotiation between 
the SDC and a Florida processor can be shown as 
 
(1) 
1 Max ( ) ( ) ,
N
cb c pb p
p
UU UU
α −α −−  
 
where Uc and Up are SDC’s payoffs and the proc-
essor’s payoffs when a bargaining agreement is 
reached and are a function of the negotiated price 
p
N; Ubc and Ubp are SDC’s payoff and the proces-
sor’s payoff when a bargaining breakdown occurs 
and are a function of the breakdown price pbc and 
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and the processor’s relative bargaining strength. 
Both parties have equal bargaining strength if α 
equals 0.5. The disagreement points in the gener-
alized Nash model are from the strategic bargain-
ing model (Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky 
1986, and Muthoo 1999) and are represented by 
the breakdown points (Ubc, Ubp). 
  Assuming that the SDC and the processing plant 
are risk-neutral, the payoff functions for the SDC 










p Ur p =− ;  Ubp = r – pbp, 
 
where c denotes the total cost per hundredweight 
faced by the SDC and r represents a processor’s 
revenue minus other costs associated with milk 
processing per hundredweight of fluid milk. 
  The generalized Nash bargaining model can 
now be written as 
 
(4)  
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Differentiating equation (4) with respect to p
N 
and setting it equal to zero, the negotiated price 
from the strategic-based generalized Nash bar-
gaining model is 
 
(5)  (1 )( ) ( )
N
bc bp pp p =− α + α . 
 
  Given the bargaining strength that SDC and the 
processor possess, as well as their respective 
threat points, the two organizations negotiate p
N. 
The negotiated price p
N and the threat point prices 
pbc and pbp make it possible to econometrically 
estimate the bargaining strength parameters by 
using a restricted regression model where the 
relative bargaining strength parameters α and (1–





Due to the weather conditions in Florida, there 
exist periods of milk shortage and surplus. The 
SDC is responsible for balancing the supply and 
demand of fluid milk. In deficit months, the SDC 
buys milk from out-of-state producers and im-
ports it into Florida for the Florida processors, 
whereas in surplus months the excess supply is 
shipped out of Florida as Class III and Class IV 
milk and is sold to butter, cheese, and/or pow-
dered milk manufacturers. In surplus months, the 
average price received by the SDC is usually less 
than the price received in the deficit months 
(USDA various issues), which indicates the pres-
ence of seasonality. In order to determine if the 
surplus and deficit months in Florida have an im-
pact on the monthly negotiated bargaining price, 
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i p  is the price received by SDC from the 
processing plants for observation i; 
i bp p is the cost 
per hundredweight that the processing plants 
would pay for fluid milk if the bargaining process 
with SDC broke down for observation i; Dj is a 
binary variable where Dj equals 1 for the February 
(December) observation when j = 2 (12), but zero 
otherwise, in order to incorporate seasonality into 
the model; 
i bc p  is the minimum price fluid milk 
processors can pay SDC for farm milk used in 
Class I products for observation i; and εi is the 
error term for observation i. In order to ensure 
that the bargaining strength parameters for SDC 
and the processors sum to one, the coefficients as-
sociated with 
i bc p  and 
i bc j pD  are restricted by 
other coefficient values contained in equation (6). 
  The cost per hundredweight that processing 
plants would pay for fluid milk if the bargaining 
process with SDC broke down (pbp) is assumed to 
be equal to the weighted average of the fluid milk 
price (Class I plus over-order premium) in surplus 
areas (i.e., Baltimore, Detroit, Kansas City, and 
Philadelphia) plus the per hundredweight hauling 
costs from those areas to the Florida processors. 
  bc p is set by the Federal Milk Marketing Order 




1 Processors cannot pay 
producers less than the Class 1 price. Further-
more, Florida has the highest Class 1 price in the 
nation. If SDC were to haul Florida milk to proc-
essors outside the state of Florida, the Class 1 
price received would be lower than in Florida and 
transportation costs would be more compared to 
Florida milk delivered to Florida processors. 
Non-Florida processors are not likely to pay a 
premium for Florida milk because they can go 
north and find less expensive milk, as the price of 
milk decreases as one travels north in the south-
eastern United States. Furthermore, if bargaining 
breaks down and SDC is looking for non-Florida 
processors to buy its milk, the non-Florida proc-
essors know that they have an advantage in the 
bargaining process with SDC. The processors, 
however, can pay more than the Class 1 price. 
The SDC and the processors bargain for an over-
order premium which, when added to the Class 1 






The U.S. Department of Agriculture and the 
Southeast Dairy Cooperative, Inc., provided the 
data used in this study. First, the data include the 
monthly prices (p
N) SDC received from the proc-
essing plants through the negotiation process, 
equaling the Class I fluid milk price in Tampa 
plus the over-order premium from the negotiation 
process. The monthly over-order premium is the 
dollars per hundredweight received by SDC in 
excess of the Class I price set by the Federal Milk 
Marketing Order. The Class 1 price (pbc) is set by 
the Federal Milk Marketing Order system, which 
is administered by the U.S. Department of Agri-
culture. Processors cannot pay producers less than 
the Class 1 price; however, the processors can 
pay more than the Class 1 price. The time period 
for all of the data sets was October 1998 to May 
2002 (44 observations). All milk prices, premi-
ums, and other relevant costs are in dollars per 
hundredweight. 
                                                                                    
1 There was a concern about p bc and p bp having endogeneity prob-
lems. p bc is set by formula and is not random. p bp is calculated by 
formula and is assumed to be non-random. As a precaution, instru-




The regression results (Table 1) were estimated 
using nonlinear least squares,
2 which gives the 
same estimates of the parameters as the maximum 
likelihood estimator under the assumption of nor-
mally distributed disturbances. The nonlinear least 
squares estimator is asymptotically normal, asymp-
totically efficient, and asymptotically consistent 
(Greene 2000). 
  Equation (6) was estimated in its restricted and 
unrestricted forms (Table 1) without the monthly 
slope shifters to test the hypothesis that bargain-
ing parameters α and (1–α) sum to one [Ho: 
p
bp α +  (1 )
bp p −α  = 1 (restricted model); Ha:  p
bp α + 
(1 )
bp p −α  ≠ 1 (unrestricted model)]. We failed to 
reject the null hypothesis as the likelihood ratio 
test was insignificant at the 0.01 percent level. 
This indicates that we failed to reject the Nash 
bargaining strength theoretical restriction. The 
coefficients from the unrestricted model sum to 
0.9693. The R
2’s are 0.9576 for the unrestricted 
model and 0.9484 for the restricted model. This 
information supports the Nash bargaining as-
sumption that the differences in bargained out-
comes are attributable to variation in outside 
options. 
  The restricted equation (6) was estimated with 
and without the monthly slope shifters to deter-
mine if relative bargaining power varies season-
ally (Table 1). We failed to reject the alternative 
hypothesis (the model with the monthly slope 
shifters) as the likelihood ratio test was signifi-
cant at the 0.10 percent level (Ho: α2 = ... = α12 = 
0; -α2 = ... = -α12 = 0; Ha: at least one α j is not 
equal to zero, or at least one -α j is not equal to 
zero). 
  Using functions of the coefficients from the 
restricted model with slope shifters [equation (6)], 
the relative bargaining strengths for SDC and the 
processors were calculated for each month (Table 
2).  t  tests were run to determine if the relative 
bargaining strengths were different from 0.5 [Ho: 
( pbp α +  j α ) – 0.5 = 0 ; Ha: ( pbp α + αj) – 0.5 ≠  0], 
the point at which SDC and the processors have 
                                                                                    
2 The LSQ routine in TSP version 4.4B was used. Serial correlation 
was corrected using a subroutine called “formar1.” The first observa-
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Table 1. Regression Results 
  Unrestricted Model  Restricted Models 
Variable Coef.  Std.  Err.  Coef. Std.  Err. Coef. Std.  Err. 
pbp 0.8639
***  0.1304 0.7264
***  0.0463 0.6664
***  0.0793 
pbpD2       0.1022
**  0.0437 
pbpD3       0.0483  0.0583 
pbpD4       0.0977  0.0663 
pbpD5       0.0373  0.0713 
pbpD6       0.0464  0.0779 
pbpD7       0.0821  0.0806 
pbpD8       0.0680  0.0795 
pbpD9       0.1166  0.0782 
pbpD10       0.0655  0.0702 
pbpD11       0.0378  0.0600 
pbpD12       0.0927
**  0.0451 
pbc  0.1054
  0.1540 0.2736
***  0.0463 0.3336
***  0.0793 
pbcD2       -0.1022
**  0.0437 
pbcD3       -0.0483  0.0583 
pbcD4       -0.0977  0.0663 
pbcD5       -0.0373  0.0713 
pbcD6       -0.0464  0.0779 
pbcD7       -0.0821  0.0806 
pbcD8       -0.0680  0.0795 
pbcD9       -0.1166  0.0782 
pbcD10       -0.0655  0.0702 
pbcD11       -0.0378  0.0600 
pbcD12       -0.0927
*  0.0451 
Rho
a  0.7896
***  0.1024 0.7227
***  0.1059 0.8234
***  0.0990 
Log  likelihood  -9.7923   -10.4046   -1.2488   
R
2  0.9576  0.9484  0.9507  
Adjusted R
2  0.9565  0.9484  0.9337  
Observations  44  44  44  
a Serial correlation was corrected using a subroutine called “formar1” which gives maximum likelihood estimates using LSQ in 
TSP version 4.4B. The first observation is retained. 
Notes: 
*** coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 0.01 level, 
** at the 0.05 level, and 
* at the 0.1 level. 
 
equal bargaining strength. All coefficients were 
statistically different from 0.5 at the .01 level, 
except those for January and November, which 
were significantly different from 0.5 at the 0.05 
level (Table 2). This indicates that SDC and the 
processors have unequal bargaining strength. The 
average monthly bargaining strength for SDC and 
the processors was statistically different from 0.5 
at the 0.01 level. 
  There are two reasons why the SDC has a ma-
jority of the bargaining power. First, processors 
are more impatient than SDC because the proces-
sors have buyers who need a continuous supply 
of dairy products. SDC provides the processors Prasertsri and Kilmer  The Bargaining Strength of a Milk Marketing Cooperative   209 
 
 
Table 2. The Monthly Bargaining Strength for 
















































** coefficients are significantly different from 0.5 
at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels. 
 
 
with all of the milk the processors need (a full 
supply contract) and the processors have come to 
expect that reliable service from SDC. Second, 
there is a risk of breakdown in negotiations be-
cause alternatives do exist for the SDC to sell 
milk to and the processors to buy milk from. If a 
breakdown does occur, there are at least three 
consequences that would affect the processors. 
First, Florida processors prefer fresh milk as op-
posed to milk that has been in a bulk tank for sev-
eral days. The older milk is before being bottled, 
the quicker bottled milk will spoil. If bargaining 
breaks down, milk will not be as fresh because it 
will be hauled from greater distances than milk 
produced in Florida. Second, if processors did not 
have access to Florida-produced milk, Florida 
fluid milk processors could purchase milk only 
from suppliers outside the northern border of 
Florida. The Florida processors would not be able 
to go east or south or west of Florida (there is 
water on three sides of Florida) to purchase milk. 
This increases the transportation cost for import-
ing milk into Florida and could lead to Florida 
processors paying higher prices for milk. Third, 
when Florida processors look for milk north of 
the Florida border, they find that the entire south-
eastern United States is deficit in milk. Surplus 
milk is located many miles from Florida, which 
affects the age of milk before it can be bottled. 
  The SDC has a majority of the bargaining 
strength, although it varies from month to month. 
The bargaining strength of SDC ranges from a 
high of 0.7831 in September to a low of 0.6664 in 
January, for a monthly average of 0.7326 (Table 
2). The months above the monthly average bar-
gaining strength for SDC are February, April, 
July, August, September, and December, with 
October being approximately average. July, Au-
gust, September, October, and December are defi-
cit months; however, February and April are sur-
plus months. Thus, bargaining strength for SDC 
is higher in most deficit months (November is a 
deficit month) and some surplus months, which 
means that high bargaining strength levels do not 
happen exclusively during surplus months. 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
In a bilateral monopoly, the tools of supply and 
demand cannot be used to analyze the negotiated 
price (p
N). The Nash bargaining model can be 
used to analyze the negotiated price in the Florida 
fluid milk market, which acts like a bilateral mo-
nopoly. The restricted model with monthly slope 
shifters accounts for 95 percent of the variation in 
the negotiated price. The bargaining strength of 
SDC and the processors sums to one, as hypothe-
sized. 
  Based on the study period, the milk marketing 
cooperatives have bargained well with the milk 
marketing processors. The monthly bargaining 
strength of SDC exceeds the monthly bargaining 
strength of the processors in all twelve months, 
ranging from a low of 0.6664 in January to a high 
of 0.7831 in September. The monthly average 
bargaining strength across all months for SDC is 
0.7326. 
  In conclusion, the threat points for the proces-
sor and SDC define the price range within which 
the negotiated price can be found. The price range 
is set by the Milk Marketing Order system. The 
negotiated price is determined by the relative bar-




Binmore, K. 1987a. “Nash Bargaining and Incomplete Infor-
mation.” In K. Binmore and P. Dasgupta, eds., The Eco-
nomics of Bargaining. Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell. 210    October 2008  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
____. 1987b. “Nash Bargaining Theory II.” In K. Binmore and 
P. Dasgupta, eds., The Economics of Bargaining. Cam-
bridge, MA: Basil Blackwell. 
____. 1987c. “Perfect Equilibria in Bargaining Models.” In K. 
Binmore and P. Dasgupta, eds., The Economics of Bar-
gaining. Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell. 
Binmore, K., A. Rubinstein, and A. Wolinsky. 1986. “The 
Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling.” RAND 
Journal of Economics 17(2): 176–188. 
Burtraw, D. 1993. “Bargaining with Noisy Delegation.” 
RAND Journal of Economics 24(1): 40–57. 
Coles, M., and A.K.G. Hildreth. 2000. “Wage Bargaining, 
Inventories, and Union Legislation.” Review of Economic 
Studies 67(2): 273–293. 
Durham, C.A., and R.J. Sexton. 1992. “Oligopsony Potential 
in Agricultural: Residual Supply Estimation in California’s 
Processing Tomato Market.” American Journal of Agri-
cultural Economics 74(4): 962–972. 
Greene, W.H. 2000. Econometric Analysis. Upper Saddle River, 
NJ: Prentice Hall, Inc. 
Helmberger, P., and J. Chavas. 1996. The Economics of Agri-
cultural Prices. New York: Prentice Hall, Inc. 
Iskow, J., and R.J. Sexton. 1991. “Bargaining Associations in 
Grower-Processor Markets for Fruits and Vegetables.” Re-
search Report No. 104, ACS, U.S. Department of Agricul-
ture. 
Jesse, E.V., A.C. Johnson, B.W Marion, and A.C. Manchester. 
1982. “Interpreting and Enforcing Section 2 of the Capper-
Volstead Act.” American Journal of Agricultural Econom-
ics 64(3): 431–443. 
Koutsoyiannis, A. 1979. Modern Microeconomics (2nd edi-
tion). London: Macmillan Press Ltd. 
Krishna, V., and R. Serrano. 1996. “Multilateral Bargaining.” 
Review of Economic Studies 63(1): 61–80. 
Muthoo, A. 1999. Bargaining Theory with Applications. Cam-
bridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Nash, J.F. 1950. “The Bargaining Problem.” Econometrica 
18(2): 155–162. 
Roth, A.E. 1979. Axiomatic Models of Bargaining. Berlin and 
New York: Springer. 
Rubinstein, A. 1982. “Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining 
Model.” Econometrica 50(1): 97–109. 
Sexton, R.J. 1993. “Noncooperative Game Theory: A Review 
with Potential Applications to Agricultural Markets.” Food 
Marketing Policy Center Research Report No. 22, Univer-
sity of Connecticut. 
U.S. Department of Agriculture. Various issues. “Florida Mar-
keting Area Federal Order No. 6 Annual Statistics.”  Agri-
cultural Marketing Service, Dairy Programs. Available at 
http://www.fmmatlanta.com (accessed November 1, 2007). 
van Damme, E.E.C. 1986. “The Nash Bargaining Solution Is 
Optimal.” Journal of Economic Theory 38(1): 78–100. 
 
 
 